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WHAT DO COURTS HAVE TO DO WITH IT?: 
THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN MAKING FEDERAL TAX LAW
Leandra Lederman
The Internal Revenue Code is an important source of federal tax law, but it is not 
the only source. The U.S. Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service 
issue important guidance, and federal courts interpret all of these authorities. This 
essay provides an overview of federal tax litigation, at both the trial and appellate 
levels, and discusses the interplay among Congress, the Treasury, and the judiciary 
in developing federal tax law.
Keywords: tax law, tax litigation, courts, Treasury, IRS
JEL Codes: K34, K41
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) generally is the fi rst place to look when con-fronting a federal tax question, but it is important to recognize that much federal 
tax law is not statutory. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) promulgates 
regulations, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issues important guidance, such as 
Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures, and Notices (Hickman, 2009). Federal courts 
interpret all of these authorities. In order to understand and apply federal tax law, it is 
important to appreciate the role that federal trial courts, Courts of Appeals, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court play in developing the law. This essay provides an overview of federal 
tax litigation, discusses the deference courts give to guidance issued by the Treasury 
and IRS, and discusses when taxpayers have “standing” to challenge the tax laws in 
court. The essay also discusses cases in which Congress may step in to amend the Code 
following a court decision.
II. BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION
Federal tax controversies involve disputes between taxpayers and the IRS. Like other 
kinds of litigation, they may raise factual issues, legal issues, or both. In many cases, 
the court hearing the case considers not only any governing statute or statutes, but also 
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relevant Treasury and IRS guidance. Courts also take account of applicable case law. 
There are a variety of types of federal tax cases, but many of them involve a disagree-
ment as to the amount of the tax liability (Cords, 2008). Most of these cases — over 
95 percent1 (Laro, 1995) — are heard by the U.S. Tax Court, which “has jurisdiction to 
redetermine income, gift, estate, and certain excise tax defi ciencies” (Cords, 2008, p. 
436). Non-defi ciency cases in the Tax Court may involve, for example, collection issues 
or the defense to liability of “innocent spouse” status (Cords, 2008, p. 436 and fn. 43). 
Disputes over a tax defi ciency often originate from an IRS audit, though they may 
also arise when a taxpayer amends its return to claim a refund of amounts previously 
paid. When a dispute arises out of an audit, the IRS cannot assess the tax without fi rst 
sending the taxpayer a letter known as a “Notice of Defi ciency” or “statutory notice.”2 
The notice gives the taxpayer the option to petition the Tax Court, so it is sometimes 
also termed the “ticket to Tax Court” (Lederman, 1996). The Tax Court has jurisdic-
tion not only over the defi ciency, but also to consider any overpayment claimed by the 
taxpayer in its petition.3 
The IRS’s mailing of the Notice of Defi ciency also starts a “prohibited period” dur-
ing which the IRS is prohibited from assessing tax.4 If the taxpayer petitions the Tax 
Court, the “prohibited period” continues until the Tax Court’s decision is fi nal. That 
includes the time until all appeals have run.5 If the taxpayer does not timely petition 
the Tax Court, the IRS will assess the tax. 
Rule 91(a)(1) of the Tax Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure requires parties 
to stipulate to the facts to the fullest extent possible. The court’s rules also permit the 
parties to submit cases fully stipulated.6 Accordingly, Tax Court trials generally focus 
on contested issues. Tax Court trials are overseen by a judge, not a jury, and are held in 
numerous cities around the United States (Lederman and Mazza, 2009, p. 297).7 The 
1 For example, in 2010, there were approximately 29,600 cases pending in Tax Court, 700 in the District 
Courts, and 500 in the Court of Federal Claims, making Tax Court cases 96.1 percent of the total (Report 
of Offi ce of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, American Bar Association Tax Section Court Proce-
dure Committee, FY 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/taxiq-11mid-032.
authcheckdam.pdf (calculation by the author)). Similarly, in 2011, Tax Court cases were 96.5 percent of 
the total (Report of Offi ce of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, American Bar Association Tax 
Section Court Procedure Committee, FY 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxa-
tion/taxiq-mid12-butler-impdev-irs-slides.authcheckdam.pdf (calculation by the author)). 
2 See I.R.C. § 6213(a).
3 See I.R.C. § 6512(b)(1). The amount of any overpayment that the Tax Court can order to be refunded is 
capped by statute in an effort at parallelism with the statute of limitations on refund claims. See I.R.C. § 
6512(b)(3). 
4 See I.R.C. § 6213(a).
5 See I.R.C. § 7481.
6 See U.S. Tax Court Rules of Practice & Procedure, 122(a). 
7 Section 7445 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the Tax Court Rules of Practice & Procedure, Rule 
10(b), both state, “[t]he principal offi ce of the Tax Court shall be in the District of Columbia, but the Tax 
Court or any of its divisions may sit at any place within the United States.” For a list of the usual places 
Tax Court trials are held, see U.S. Tax Court, “Places of Trial,” http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/dpt_cities.htm.
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taxpayer is expected to request a place for trial at the time of fi ling the petition. If the 
taxpayer does not do so, the IRS is expected to make such a request in conjunction with 
its answer.8 Tax Court practice is also distinct from most courts in that briefs are fi led 
after trial, rather than before trial.9
Most opinions in regular Tax Court cases are Memorandum Opinions, which are 
not offi cial pronouncements of the Tax Court, have little precedential value, and are 
privately published.10 Some opinions are Division Opinions (sometimes referred to as 
“full T.C.s”); they have precedential value and are offi cially published (Cohen, 2001). 
The Chief Judge decides whether a particular opinion will be a Division Opinion or a 
Memorandum Opinion.11 
Some Tax Court cases are reviewed by the full court in conference. Those decisions 
are always issued as Division Opinions and include a statement that they were reviewed. 
They may contain a majority opinion, concurrences, and dissenting opinions. Generally 
speaking, decisions receive review by the full court when they: (1) decide issues not pre-
viously considered by the court; (2) invalidate a Treasury Regulation; (3) would confl ict 
with existing Tax Court decisions; (4) involve an issue not previously considered by 
the Tax Court and would confl ict with the decision of a Court of Appeals other than the 
one to which appeal would lie; or (5) involve an issue on which the Tax Court has been 
reversed by a court other than the one with jurisdiction over any appeal (Crimm, 1999).
If a Tax Court case has less than $50,000 in issue for each tax year, the taxpayer 
can request to have the Tax Court to hear it as a “small tax case” (or “S case”).12 The 
case will then be docketed as an S case, but “[t]he Court, on its own motion or on the 
motion of a party to the case, may, at any time before the trial commences, issue an order 
directing that the small tax case designation be removed and that the proceedings not 
be conducted as a small tax case.”13 Small tax cases are considered under more relaxed 
rules of procedure and evidence, but decisions in them are not appealable.14 Opinions 
in small tax cases are called Summary Opinions, and they have no precedential value. 
Because the opinions in S cases have no precedential value, occasionally the Tax Court 
will move a case out of S case status into the regular procedure if it appears to have broad 
importance (Nelson and Keightley, 1988). As of fi scal year 2011, S cases comprised 
39.6 percent of the Tax Court’s docket.15
 8 See U.S. Tax Court Rules of Practice & Procedure, 140(a).
 9 See U.S. Tax Court Rules of Practice & Procedure, 151(a). 
10 See Nico v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 647, 654 (1977), affi rmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 
565 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1977), noting that Tax Court memorandum opinions do not serve as controlling 
precedent.
11 See I.R.C. § 7460. 
12 See I.R.C. § 7463(a); U.S. Tax Court Rules of Practice & Procedure, Rule 171(a).
13 U.S. Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 171(d).
14 See I.R.C. 7463(a), (b).
15 See “Report of Offi ce of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, American Bar Association Tax Section 
Court Procedure Committee, FY 2011,” http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/
taxiq-mid12-butler-impdev-irs-slides.authcheckdam.pdf.
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The Tax Court is not the only court that hears federal tax cases. For example, if the 
taxpayer has fi led a bankruptcy petition, a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to “determine 
the amount or legality of any tax, any fi ne or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition 
to tax, whether or not previously assessed, whether or not paid,”16 unless the issue was 
“adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction before the 
commencement of the [bankruptcy] case.”17 If an action is pending in Tax Court at the 
time the taxpayer fi les a bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy court determines whether it 
or the Tax Court will hear the case (Germain, 2004). If the converse is the case — dur-
ing a pending bankruptcy action, the taxpayer receives a Notice of Defi ciency — Tax 
Court precedent generally provides that it can consider the defi ciency issues, but not 
the question of whether the tax debt was discharged in bankruptcy.18
Bankruptcy is something of a special situation in that it applies to a subset of tax-
payers, but it is a context in which taxpayers can resolve their substantive tax disputes 
before having to pay the tax. The other alternatives to Tax Court involve fully paying 
the tax and then seeking a refund, either in U.S. District Court or in the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims.19 To pursue this refund route, the taxpayer must pay in full the tax 
the IRS has claimed is due20 and then must follow the refund procedures, starting with 
timely fi ling a refund claim.21 The taxpayer may not fi le suit for a refund until either 
six months have elapsed from the fi ling of the claim or the IRS mails the taxpayer a 
notice of disallowance.22 The taxpayer also faces an outside limit on the time to fi le suit 
of two years from the date the IRS mails the notice of disallowance.23 
Far fewer cases are litigated in the refund courts than in Tax Court (Table 1).24 The 
main reason for that is likely the fact that the taxpayer must prepay before pursuing a 
refund suit, whereas, in Tax Court, the taxpayer need not prepay the defi ciency (Laro, 
1995). In addition, the Notice of Defi ciency informs taxpayers of the Tax Court option 
and the deadline to fi le there but says nothing about the refund option, which may result 
in some unrepresented taxpayers assuming that the Tax Court route is the only one 
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 505(a).
17 See 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2)(A), providing that the bankruptcy court may not determine, among other things, 
“the amount or legality of a tax, fi ne, penalty, or addition to tax if such amount or legality was contested 
before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction before the com-
mencement of the case under this title . . . .”
18 See, e.g., Moody v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 655, 658 (1990); Nielson v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 1, 8 (1990); 
and Germain, 2004. By contrast, the Tax Court has held that it in can consider in the context of a post-
collection proceeding the question of whether a tax debt was discharged in bankruptcy. See Washington v. 
Commissioner, 120 T.C. 114, 120 (2003), which involved a lien proceeding under Code section 6320, and 
see Neal Swanson v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 111, 117 (2003), which involved a levy proceeding under 
Code section 6330.
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
20 Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
21 See I.R.C. § 7422(a). The statute of limitations on refund claims generally gives the taxpayer the longer 
of three years from the time the return was fi led or two years from the tax was paid. See I.R.C. § 6511.
22 See I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1). The taxpayer may also waive disallowance. See I.R.C. § 6532(a)(3).
23 See I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1).
24 See the text accompanying footnote 36.
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available.25 In regular Tax Court cases, many taxpayers represent themselves. For 
example, in 2011, there were 14,907 non-S case petitions, of which 9,750, or 65.4 
percent were pro se.26 In S cases, the overwhelming majority of taxpayers proceed pro 
se.27 Some initially unrepresented taxpayers hire counsel after fi ling a Tax Court peti-
tion, but once the case is docketed in Tax Court, it cannot be removed to another court 
or voluntarily dismissed (Lederman, 2001). As Table 1 refl ects, the courts’ inventory 
of cases has fl uctuated over time.
Tax Court decisions generally are appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Circuit 
within which the taxpayer resided (or had its principal place of business or principal 
offi ce) at the time the petition was fi led.28 The Tax Court is an interesting position 
because it is a national trial court whose decisions are reviewable by multiple circuits. 
It is possible, for example, that a judge could decide the consolidated cases of multiple 
parties, each of whom appeal to different circuits.29 The Tax Court has held that it will 
“follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point where appeal from our 
d ecision lies to that Court of Appeals and to that court alone.”30 Otherwise, the Tax 
Court is free to establish its own rule or follow its own precedent.31
District Court cases are appealable to the Courts of Appeals for the particular circuit 
in which they are located;32 Court of Federal Claims decisions are appealable to the 
25 See Lederman and Mazza (2009), reproducing a Notice of Defi ciency, which includes two paragraphs about 
fi ling a petition in Tax Court and nothing about pursuing refund procedures. A provision not included in 
the Code (an off-Code provision) requires that the Notice of Defi ciency also specify the date that is the 
last day to timely petition the Tax Court. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 
1998, Pub. L. 105-206, § 3463(a), 112 Stat. 685, 767 (1998).
26 See “Report of Offi ce of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, American Bar Association Tax Section 
Court Procedure Committee, FY 2011,” http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/
taxiq-mid12-butler-impdev-irs-slides.authcheckdam.pdf (calculations by the author).
27 For example, in 2010, there were 13,747 pro se S case petitions and 1,250 represented S case petitions, and 
in 2011, there were 13,483 pro se S case petitions and 1,303 represented S case petitions. See “Report of 
Offi ce of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, American Bar Association Tax Section Court Procedure 
Committee, FY 2011,” http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/taxiq-mid12-butler-
impdev-irs-slides.authcheckdam.pdf. The ratio in each of those years is not unusual. See “Report of Offi ce 
of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, American Bar Association Tax Section Court Procedure 
Committee, FY 2011,” http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/taxiq-mid12-butler-
impdev-irs-slides.authcheckdam.pdf. 
28 See I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1). 
29 See, e.g., Investment Research Assoc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-407. That case has multiple lines of 
subsequent history. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affi rmed. See Ballard v. Comm’r, 321 
F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2003). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits affi rmed in part and 
reversed in part. See Lisle v. Comm’r, 341 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2003); Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 337 F.3d 
833 (7th Cir. 2003). The Kanter and Ballard cases made it to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Ballard v. 
Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40 (2005).
30 Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742 , 757 (1970), aff’d on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
31 See Golsen at 757, stating that “[w]e shall remain able to foster uniformity by giving effect to our own 
views in cases appealable to courts whose views have not yet been expressed, and, even where the relevant 
Court of Appeals has already made its views known, by explaining why we agree or disagree with the 
precedent that we feel constrained to follow.”
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1).
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.33 Under U.S. Supreme Court Rule 10, Court 
of Appeals decisions are appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court, which has discretion 
to grant a writ of certiorari.
A Supreme Court decision is binding precedent for all lower courts.34 However, 
Congress can change the law by amending the Code if it disagrees with the Supreme 
Court’s decision. Although Congress changes the tax law frequently, and taxpayers 
then respond to the new laws, instances of Congress acting promptly to change the law 
interpreted in a court decision are not particularly frequent. One study found that “[o]
n average, the likelihood of a congressional response to a case in the fi rst year after 
decision is 3%,” though a quick response is much more likely in cases involving lob-
byists, a Supreme Court invitation for oversight, and other factors (Staudt, Lindstadt, 
and O’Connor, 2007, pp. 1381–1382).
A famous example of a speedy Congressional reaction to a Supreme Court decision 
involves Gitlitz v. Commissioner:35
In Gitlitz v. Commissioner, an insolvent S Corporation was relieved of its debt. 
Pursuant to Code § 108(a)(1)(B), the S Corporation excluded the amount of 
the discharge. Contending that debt relief to an insolvent taxpayer is income, 
even if it is excluded from gross income, the taxpayer treated the amount 
relieved as an “item of income” and increased his basis by that amount. After 
increasing his basis, the taxpayer deducted his share of previously suspended 
net operating losses. The deductibility of these losses was the ultimate issue 
(Smith, 2007, p. 50).
The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer could increase his basis by the excluded 
amount and use that basis to deduct the suspended losses.36 However, the following 
year, Congress amended the Code to change that result prospectively.37 
33 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
34 “In the American system, if an issue under consideration has been directly decided by the Supreme Court, 
lower courts are bound to reach the same result, ‘unless and until [the Supreme] Court reinterprets the 
binding precedent.’” (Jois, 2009, p. 66, quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 238 (1997)).
35 See 531 U.S. 206 (2001). An older example involves Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941), which 
disallowed the deduction of the expenses involved in managing an investment portfolio as not incurred in 
a trade or business. Congress reacted by enacting Code section 212, which allows the deduction of invest-
ment expenses (Sanchirico, 2008). Unusually, the new section was made retroactive so that it applied to 
Mr. Higgins. See 56 Stat. 819, I.R.C. § 23 note which states that “For the purposes of the Revenue Act of 
1938 or any prior revenue Act the amendments made to the Internal Revenue Code by this section shall 
be effective as if they were a part of such revenue Act on the date of its enactment.”
36 Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206, 218 (2001).
37 See The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (JCWAA), Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21, 
40 § 402(a) (codifi ed as amended at I.R.C. § 108(d)(7)(A)). Chapman (2002, p. 1202) explained: “Sec-
tion 402(a) of the JCWAA amends 108(d)(7)(A) to provide that, in applying 108 at the corporate level, 
excluded discharge of indebtedness income does not pass through to the shareholders under 1366. It follows, 
therefore, that shareholders’ bases are not increased under 1367. The losses suspended under 1366(d) are 
not available because they are reduced under 108(b)(2)(A) by the amount of the excluded discharge of 
indebtedness income.”
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Part II discussed federal tax litigation generally and possible Congressional response 
to court decisions. As indicated above, the courts apply not only the Code and prior 
court decisions, but also administrative guidance issued by the Treasury and the IRS. 
The Treasury has a general grant of authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regu-
lations for the enforcement of [the Code], including all rules and regulations as may 
be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.”38 The 
Treasury produces dozens of regulations each year (Hickman, 2007, p. 1730), but 
sometimes fails for decades to promulgate regulations explicitly called for by statute 
(Gall, 2003, p. 413).
Although the Treasury has not always followed general administrative law principles, 
regulations generally are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement of 
notice to the public and an opportunity to comment (Aprill, 2012). As discussed above, 
the IRS also produces guidance.39 Guidance that does not have the “force of law” is 
not subject to the notice-and-comment requirement and is therefore quicker to produce 
(Hickman, forthcoming).
The courts generally apply the administrative guidance produced by the IRS and 
Treasury, though they typically accord Treasury Regulations more deference than 
IRS guidance (Lederman, 2012). The U.S. Supreme Court recently made clear that 
the substantial deference established in the leading Chevron case applies to Treasury 
regulations regardless of whether they were promulgated under the general authority of 
Code section 7805 or under the authority of a specifi c statute to which the regulations 
relate.40 Chevron provides a two-step process:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court 
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be nec-
essary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute 
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specifi c issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.41
The level of deference due guidance such as Revenue Rulings and Revenue Proce-
dures is less clear, but most commentators agree that they warrant analysis under the 
38 I.R.C. § 7805(a). For more on the regulations process, see Mann (2012).
39 Mann (2012, p. 896) observes that, “Over the last three years, the Internal Revenue Bulletin index shows 
the publication of 103 revenue rulings, 169 revenue procedures and 292 notices.” 
40 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711–15 (2011).
41 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (footnotes 
omitted).
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less deferential Skidmore case,42 which provided that the respect due “will depend upon 
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis-
tency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power 
to persuade, if lacking power to control.”43
Although Treasury regulations receive substantial deference, courts do sometimes 
invalidate them. Several recent cases that have done so relate to time limitations. For 
example, in Swallows Holding v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered a regula-
tion that
interpret[ed] section 882(c)(2) to provide that a foreign corporation generally 
is entitled to deduct its expenses only if it fi les a timely return. Under the 
relevant part of the disputed regulations, a return is timely if it is fi led before 
an arbitrary 18-month deadline . . . devised by the Secretary. The Secretary 
issued the disputed regulations sta ting that section 882(c)(2) contains a “clear” 
requirement that a foreign corporation fi le its return timely in order to deduct 
its expenses.44
The Tax Court found the regulations invalid as inconsistent with the plain language 
of the statute.45 The decision was reversed on appeal, with the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit fi nding that the regulation should have been given deference under 
Chevron because the statute was ambiguous.46 
In Lantz v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered a regulation that imposed a two-
year fi ling deadline on a claim for equitable relief from joint and several liability for taxes 
arising out of a return fi led jointly by a married couple.47 The other portions of the statute 
contained limitations periods, but the equitable relief provision was silent on whether 
a deadline applied.48 Because the case was appealable to the Seventh Circuit, which 
applied Chevron deference, the Tax Court considered the issue under that standard.49 
42 See Lederman (2012, p. 667); see also Hickman (2009, p. 260), noting that “[s]ince the Court’s decision 
in [United States v.] Mead [Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)], most courts and commentators have assumed 
or concluded that Skidmore provides the appropriate evaluative standard for revenue rulings . . . although 
not everyone agrees” (footnotes omitted). Hickman (2009, p. 260) has questioned that view arguing that 
Revenue Rulings may have “force of law” status and thus be eligible for Chevron deference, just as Treasury 
Regulations are (see also Hickman, forthcoming). 
43 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
44 See 126 T.C. 96, 98–99 (2006) (reviewed by the court) (footnote omitted), rev’d 515 F.3d 162 (3rd Cir. 2008).
45 Swallows Holding at 132. This case was decided before Mayo Foundation, and the court also applied the 
deference standard of Natl. Muffl er Dealers Association v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). See Swal-
lows Holding at 129–30. 
46 See 515 F.3d 162, 167, 171 (3rd Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Swallows Holding II]. The Court of Appeals framed 
the issue as follows: “The crucial issue before us is whether the Tax Court erred in applying National Muf-
fl er rather than Chevron when evaluating the validity of Treas. Reg. 1.882-4(a)(3)(i).” Swallows Holding 
II at 167.
47 See 132 T.C. 131 (2009) (reviewed by the court), rev’d, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010).
48 Lantz at 134 (contrasting IRC §§ 6015(b) and (c) with IRC § 6015(f)).
49 Lantz at 137.
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It found that imposing a time limit was contrary to the statute under Chevron step one, 
but that even if it were to reach step two, “the regulation is impermissible because it 
is contrary to the intent of Congress.”50 The court also stated that “by explicitly creat-
ing a 2-year limitation in subsections (b) and (c) but not subsection (f), Congress has 
‘spoken’ by its audible silence.”51
As in Swallows Holding, the Tax Court’s decision in Lantz was reversed on appeal. 
In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that 
it “would not accept ‘audible silence’ as a reliable guide to congressional mea ning. 
‘Audible silence,’ like Milton’s ‘darkness visible’ or the Zen koan ‘the sound of one hand 
clapping,’ requires rather than guides interpretation. Lantz’s brief translates ‘audible 
silence’ as ‘plain language,’ and adds (mysticism must be catching) that ‘Congress 
intended the plain language of the language used in the statute.’”52 The court further 
stated that “The delegation in section 6015(f) is express, and the cases are legion that 
say that Treasury regulations are entitled to judicial deference . . . .” and deferred to 
the regulation.53
Following that and other decisions upholding the two-year limitations period, the 
IRS changed its view and issued a Notice stating, “Notwithstanding these court deci-
sions, Treasury and the IRS have concluded that the regulations issued under section 
6015 should be revised so that individuals who request equitable relief under section 
6015(f) will no longer be required to submit a request for equitable relief within two 
years of the IRS’s fi rst collection activity against the requesting spouse with respect to 
the joint tax liability.”54
Even more recently, a controversy erupted over regulations interpreting the time period 
within which the IRS can assess tax (Lederman, 2012, pp. 679–687). The regulations 
interpreted two Code sections that extend the usual limitations period from three years 
to six where there was a substantial omission from income.55 Under the approach of the 
regulations, the longer period applies where the omission was caused by the infl ation 
of tax basis outside the context of a trade or business.
Because the regulations were targeted at a well-known tax shelter (commonly known 
as “Son of BOSS”) that had many investors, the regulations were at issue in a number 
of court cases (Lederman, 2012, p. 679). One of the early decisions was by the Tax 
Court, which considered the Temporary regulations. It held that the regulations were 
both not applicable because of the terms of the effective date provision,56 and invalid 
50 Lantz at 141.
51 Lantz at 139.
52 Lantz, 607 F.3d at 481. 
53 Lantz at 486. For a critique of Judge Posner’s opinion, see Camp (2010).
54 IRS Notice 2011-70; 2011 IRB LEXIS 416 (July 25, 2011).
55 See I.R.C. §§ 6501(e); 6229(c)(2).
56 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 220 (2010) (reviewed by the court), rev’d, 
650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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and therefore not entitled to deference.57 The Tax Court reached the conclusion that 
the regulations were invalid because it found that, under the fi rst step of Chevron, 
the statute was unambiguous according to a Supreme Court case, Colony,58 t hat had 
interpreted a previous version of the statute but had referred to the later version in 
dicta.59 I ntermountain was reversed on appeal60 but the Fourth and Fifth Circuits 
also found the regulation inapplicable,61 in contrast to other circuits that upheld the 
regulation.62 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Fourth Circuit case, Home Concrete,63 
and invalidated the regulation in a divided decision, fi nding that “Colony has already 
interpreted the statute, and there is no longer any different construction that is consistent 
with Colony and available for adoption by the agency.”64 Because the Court found that 
Colony left no room for agency action, it did not address the question of whether the 
Treasury can issue a regulation that interprets a statute differently than a prior Supreme 
Court decision that found a statute capable of multiple interpretations. The Supreme 
Court had previously held in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand 
X Internet Services, that “A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an 
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court 
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute 
and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”65 However, in Brand X, the previous 
court decision was a Court of Appeals decision,66 not a Supreme Court decision, as 
Chief Justice Roberts noted during the Home Concrete oral argument.67
57 Intermountain at 224.
58 Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
59 See Intermountain at 220–24.
60 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 650 F.3d 691, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying Chevron 
deference to the fi nal regulations).
61 See Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 256–57 (4th Cir. 2011), noting that the 
regulation does not apply by the terms of its applicability date and Colony is controlling, so the regulation 
would not be entitled to Chevron deference anyway, affi rmed, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3274 (2012). And see 
Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 355, 360, n.9 (5th Cir. 2011), noting that Colony controls, but it is 
unclear if Chevron would apply if it did not, given the regulations’ retroactivity and litigation focus.
62 See Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2011), granting Chevron 
deference and fi nding arguments regarding procedural defects in the temporary regulations mooted by 
the issuance of the fi nal regulations. And see Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 647 F.3d 929, 939–40 
(10th Cir. 2011), similarly applying Chevron deference to the fi nal regulations and fi nding that arguments 
regarding the temporary regulations were mooted by the issuance of the fi nal regulations. 
63 See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 71 (2011) (granting certiorari).
64 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 3274, pp. 14–15 (2012).
65 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
66 See Brand X at 979–80 (applying AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000)).
67 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, No. 11-139 (U.S. 
Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-139.pdf, in which 
Chief Justice Roberts states,“We’ve never said an agency can change what we’ve said the law means.”
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IV. STANDING ISSUES
The regulations discussed above all imposed restrictions on taxpayers, either limit-
ing their ability to make a claim, or, in the case of Intermountain, resulting in a longer 
period for assessment of tax. What about regulations that are arguably more generous 
than a statute, resulting in forgone revenue to the federal fi sc, for which we all pay 
indirectly? Polsky (2009, p. 239) has explained that, “[i]n general, taxpayers do not 
have standing in a suit that concerns someone else’s taxes because the relief sought 
would not benefi t the taxpayer in any tangible way. In other words, a person does not 
have standing to challenge a tax rule merely because of one’s status as a taxpayer; 
rather, the person must suffer a tangible injury in order to challenge the validity of a 
regulation.”
For example, in DiamlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,68 the Supreme Court ruled that in 
order for the taxpayers to have standing to challenge an Ohio franchise tax credit, they 
had to satisfy the requirement in Article III of the U.S. Constitution that there be an 
actual case or controversy.69 The Court stated, “The requisite elements of this ‘core 
component derived directly from the Constitution’ are familiar: ‘A plaintiff must allege 
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely 
to be redressed by the requested relief.’”70
More recently, in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,71 the 
Supreme Court considered a Constitutional challenge to a state tax credit for contribu-
tions to school tuition organizations, which “use these contributions to provide scholar-
ships to students attending private schools, many of which are religious.”72 The Court 
explained that the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III requires standing.73 
The Court then reiterated the general rule against taxpayer standing:
Absent special circumstances . . . standing cannot be based on a plaintiff’s 
mere status as a taxpayer. This Court has rejected the general proposition that 
an individual who has paid taxes has a “continuing, legally cognizable inter-
est in ensuring that those funds are not used by the Government in a way that 
violates the  Constitution.” . . . . This precept has been referred  to as the rule 
against taxpayer standing.74
Thus, in general, the remedy for a taxpayer with a general grievance about how the 
government spends its money is not through the courts. Instead, the taxpayer must use 
68 See 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
69 DiamlerChrysler at 342.
70 DiamlerChrysler at 342 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
71 See 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
72 Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization at 1440. 
73 Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization at 1442.
74 Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization at 1442–43 (citations omitted).
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the political system and attempt to get the government to change its policies. However, 
in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization, the Court further pointed out that 
Flast v. Cohen established an exception to the rule against taxpayer standing:
Flast held that taxpayers have standing when two conditions are met. 
The fi rst condition is that there must be a “logical link” between the plaintiff’s 
taxpayer status “and the type of legislative enactment attacked.” In Flast, 
. . . the allegation was  that the Federal Government violated the Establishment 
Clause in the exercise of its legislative authority both to collect and spend tax 
dollars. In the decades since Flast, the Court has been careful to enforce this 
requirement. . . .
The second condition for standing under Flast is that there must be “a nexus” 
between the plaintiff’s taxpayer status and “the precise nature of the consti-
tutional infringement alleged.” This condition was deemed satisfi ed in Flast 
based on the allegation that Government funds had been spent on an outlay 
for religion in contravention of the Establishment Clause.75
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization found the Flast exception inapplicable 
because the case involved tax credits rather than a governmental expenditure.76 
In some cases involving a taxpayer-friendly regulation or IRS guidance, there might 
nonetheless be a circumstance in which a taxpayer is in the unusual position of being 
directly harmed by it and thus able to bring a challenge. For example, with respect to 
the taxpayer-friendly elective entity classifi cation regime known as “Check-the-Box,” 
Polsky (2004, p. 239) argued: 
Because the check-the-box regulations allow an entity to elect its classifi ca-
tion, it might appear on fi rst glance that all taxpayers in all instances will fare 
no worse under the regulations than under [the prior regime]. If this were the 
case, no one would have standing to challenge the regulations. Although these 
regulations will generally work to the taxpayer’s benefi t (or at least not to 
the taxpayer’s detriment), there will be certain situations where the taxpayer 
would be better off under the corporate resemblance test.  One could think of 
a number of such scenarios . . . .
He went on to provide three examples (Polsky, 2004, pp. 239–243). Those examples 
were specifi c to the context of the Check-the-Box regulations, however, so they are 
not generalizable. 
75 Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization at 1445 (citations omitted).
76 Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization at 1447–48.
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Another context involving taxpayer-favorable guidance involved a series of publicly 
criticized Notices the IRS promulgated in 2008 and 2009 liberalizing the provision that 
limited the use of net operating losses after a change in corporate ownership and appar-
ently benefi tting specifi c taxpayers without naming them (Elliott, 2009; Block, 2010). 
For example, Notice 2008-83 stated succinctly, “For purposes of section 382(h), any 
deduction properly allowed after an ownership change (as defi ned in section 382(g)) 
to a bank with respect to losses on loans or bad debts (including any deduction for a 
reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts) shall not be treated as a built-in loss or 
a deduction that is attributable to periods before the change date.”77 Accordingly, the 
Notice allowed a bank that acquired another bank not to face the usual limitation on 
the deduction of the acquired bank’s built-in losses (Block, 2010).
Although the Notice did not name a particular taxpayer or taxpayers who would 
benefi t from it, the context in which the Notice was issued was suggestive:
At the time this notice was released, Congress was debating emergency bailout 
legislation, and Citigroup and Wells Fargo were competing to acquire control 
of Wachovia. Before the notice, it appeared that Wells Fargo’s bid had failed 
and that Citigroup would acquire Wachovia. According to observers, the tax 
savings from this dramatic change in IRS interpretation of the § 382 loss limi-
tation rules enabled Wells Fargo, which had actively lobbied for the change, 
to make a new and successful bid (Block, 2010, pp. 218–219). 
The Treasury did not compute the cost of the Notice or seek public input in advance of 
issuing the Notice. Block (2010, p. 219) notes that, “Some estimated that the overall 
cost to taxpayers would be between $100 billion and $140 billion,” which includes 
costs attributable to other taxpayers who made use of the ruling.
It would be diffi cult to fi nd a taxpayer with standing to challenge this Notice (Shenoi, 
2010, p. 551). However, Notice 2008-83 angered Congress and provoked it to rebuke 
the Treasury, stating, in an off-Code provision:
(a) Findings — Congress fi nds as follows:
(1) The delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Treasury under 
section 382(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 does not authorize 
the Secretary to provide exemptions or special rules that are restricted to 
particular industries or classes of taxpayers.
77 Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905, at § 2. The Notice also stated, “The Internal Revenue Service and Treasury 
Department are studying the proper treatment under section 382 (h) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) 
of certain items of deduction or loss allowed after an ownership change to a corporation that is a bank (as 
defi ned in section 581) both immediately before and after the change date (as defi ned in section 382 (j)). 
As described below under the heading Reliance on Notice, such banks may rely upon this guidance unless 
and until there is additional guidance.” See Notice 2008-83 at § 1.
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(2) Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is inconsistent with the con-
gressional intent in enacting such section 382(m).
(3) The legal authority to prescribe Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-
83 is doubtful.78
Congress did, however, grandfather transactions that occurred before January 16, 2009 
or took place under a binding written agreement entered into before that date.79
V. CONCLUSION
As the discussion above shows, despite the importance of the Code, there are several 
important non-statutory sources of federal tax law. Along with Congress, the courts, 
the Treasury, and the IRS all play important roles in the development of the tax law. 
The role of the courts typically is to interpret tax statutes, regulations, and other tax 
rules and apply the law in cases before them. Court decisions generally have prec-
edential value. However, Congress makes frequent changes to the tax law, and, even 
if it is not responding to a particular case, the amendments may make prior case law 
irrelevant. Similarly, the Treasury or IRS may change a regulation or ruling, in which 
case a court hearing a future case will be faced with a novel question. This nuanced 
dance among the three branches of government is part of what makes federal tax law so 
interesting.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank Bryan Camp, Bill Gentry, Kristin Hickman, and 
Joshua Odintz for helpful comments on a prior draft; participants in the 2012 National 
Tax Association Spring Symposium for helpful discussions; and Karun Ahuja, Donald 
Bierer, Jennifer Hepp, and Michele Roberts for valuable research assistance.
REFERENCES
Aprill, Ellen P., 2012. “The Impact of Agency Guidance Procedures and Judicial Review on Tax 
Reform.” National Tax Journal 65 (4), 917–932. 
Block, Cheryl D., 2010. “Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout.” Washington Uni-
versity Law Review 88 (1), 149–228. 
Camp, Bryan T., 2010. “Interpreting Statutory Silence.” Tax Notes 128 (3), 501–515.
Chapman, Robert B., 2002. “Bankruptcy.” Mercer Law Review 53 (4), 1199–1313.
78 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261(a), 123 Stat. 115, 342–43.
79 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 at § 1261(b).
National Tax Journal914
Cohen, Mary Ann, 2001. “How to Read Tax Court Opinions.” Houston Business and Tax Law 
Journal 1, 1–11. 
Cords, Danshera, 2008. “Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection Decisions.” 
Saint Louis University Law Journal 52 (2), 429–478.
Crimm, Nina, 1999. Tax Court Litigation: Practice and Procedure. Aspen Law and Business 
Publishers, New York, NY. 
Elliott, Amy S., 2009. “Year in Review: Treasury Provides Certainty and Relief in Economic 
Crisis.” Tax Notes 122 (Jan. 5), 47–49.
Gall, Phillip (2003). “Phantom Tax Regulations: The Curse of Spurned Delegations,” Tax Lawyer 
56 (2), 413–450.
Germain, Gregory, 2004. “Discharging Their Duty: A Critical Assessment of the Tax Court’s 
Refusal to Consider Bankruptcy Discharge Questions.” Virginia Tax Review 23 (3), 531–613. 
Hickman, Kristin E., 2007. “Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack Of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements.” Notre Dame Law 
Review 82 (5), 1727–1807.
Hickman, Kristin E., 2009. “IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation.” 
Michigan State Law Review 2009 (1), 239–272. 
Hickman, Kristin E., forthcoming. “Unpacking the Force of Law.” Vanderbilt Law Review.
Jois, Goutam U., 2009. “Stare Decisis Is Cognitive Error.” Brooklyn Law Review 75 (1), 63–141.
Laro, David, 1995. “The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal.” University of 
Illinois Law Review 1995 (1), 17–29.
Lederman, Leandra, 1996. “‘Civil’izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to 
Statutory Notices of Defi ciency.” University California at Davis Law Review 30 (1), 183–245.
Lederman, Leandra, 2001. “Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court’s Exercise of Equitable 
Powers Constitutional?” Florida Tax Review 5 (5), 357–411.
Lederman, Leandra, 2012. “The Fight Over ‘Fighting Regs’ and Judicial Deference in Tax Litiga-
tion.” Boston University Law Review 92 (2), 643 –700.
Lederman, Leandra, and Stephen W. Mazza, 2009. Tax Controversies: Practice and Procedure. 
LexisNexis, Newark, NJ.
Mann, Roberta, 2012. “Chief Counsel’s Subtle Impact on Revenue: Regulations, Litigation, and 
Administrative Guidance.” National Tax Journal 65 (4), 889–898. 
Nelson, William F., and James J. Keightley, 1988. “Managing the Tax Court Inventory.” Virginia 
Tax Review 7 (3), 451–483.
Polsky, Gregg D., 2004. “Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?” Boston University Law 
Review 84 (1), 185–246.
The Judiciary’s Role in Making Federal Tax Law 915
Sanchirico, Chris William, 2008. “The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Manag-
ers with Profi t Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?” University of Chicago Law Review 75 (3), 
1071–1153.
Shenoi, Sunil, 2010. “Undoing Undue Favors: Providing Competitors with Standing to Chal-
lenge Favorable IRS Actions.” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 43 (2), 531–568 
(Student Note). 
Smith, Andre L., 2007. “Formulaically Describing 21st Century Supreme Court Tax Jurispru-
dence.” Houston Business and Tax Law Journal 8 (1), 37–89.
Staudt, Nancy C., Renee Lindstadt, and Jason O’Connor, 2007. “Judicial Decisions as Legisla-
tion: Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954–2005,” New York University 
Law Review 82 (5), 1340–1402.
